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Police in democratic societies operate in a space
forged between their constitutional mandate and
the legal framework that defines how they must
operate. The vision and mission of the SAPS, as
based on the constitution, requires police to:
• Prevent, combat and investigate crime
• Protect and secure the inhabitants of the 
Republic and their property
• Uphold and enforce the law
• Create a safe and secure environment for all 
people in South Africa
• Prevent anything that may threaten the safety 
or security of any community1
Such a mandate is impossible for a police service
alone to achieve; yet statements by police leaders,
research on SAPS culture, as well as this author's
experience as a police reservist, suggest most SAPS
members nonetheless embrace the mandate.2
Given the high ideals of the mandate it would
seem obvious that police participation in illicit
activities would be detrimental to their
effectiveness. But can police dishonesty,
corruption, or crime ever be considered an
enhancer of police performance? This article
suggests it depends on who is doing the
measuring, and how. It argues that current
approaches to performance measurement in the
SAPS may encourage disreputable and illicit
actions by some in order to meet performance
targets, rather than encouraging effective policing.
The article argues that falsely positive assessments
of achievement that hide illicit activity are an
almost inevitable consequence of the measures of
achievement as they currently exist.  Additionally,
the article suggests that that some of these illicit
actions erode an already tenuous social contract
between citizens and the police and that the
measures of performance ignore the importance
of citizen perceptions of police performance.
AN EVOLVING POLICE CULTURE 
Informal rule bending has for decades been noted
as a trend in police cultures, developing as a
means to realise a mandate within a restrictive
environment. Usually such cultures develop







Crime statistics can only offer a limited measure of police performance, if they can be a measure of
performance at all. Many types of crime fluctuate completely independently of policing.  To place pressure
on the police to reduce crime statistics leads to perverse incentives, typically to not record crime (see the
article by Bruce in this edition of SACQ). In South Africa, crime statistics are still seen as a measure of
police performance rather than a measure of the challenge facing the police, and indeed society as a whole.
Other police performance assessment measures currently in place also contribute to poor and abusive
policing practices. This article explores these issues by drawing on research conducted in recent years, and
through reference to the South African Police Service (SAPS) performance chart. 
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this is not always so. Take for example the much-
touted rhetoric that became prominent in the
second half of 2009, perhaps oversimplified by the
media as 'shoot to kill'. While a clear call to the
police to act illegally, in that the law prohibits the
intentional murder of any person, it signified that
a causal link was drawn between police use of
force and police effectiveness. The national
commissioner, minister and deputy minister of
police, among others, repeatedly spoke of the need
for police not deliberate over, or fear using lethal
force against armed suspects, inferring that this
would instil fear in the would-be criminal, and
reduce crime. Analysts expressed concern that
such rhetoric effectively encouraged police to act
recklessly, or even to break the law by acting
outside of the parameters of Section 49 of the
Criminal Procedures Act governing police use of
force.3 Although only at a stretch, the rhetoric can
be interpreted as equating illegal police action
with enhancing police performance. 
While a more trigger-happy police service (or
force) may serve to temporarily satiate public
anger over crime, will it lead to a greater long-
term citizen satisfaction with police performance?
Unfortunately citizen satisfaction is not currently
high up on the SAPS performance measurement
agenda, while 'tough on crime' rhetoric appears an
easy way to deal with public pressure. 
POLICING STATISTICS RATHER
THAN CRIME STATISTICS
One of the simplest and most visible ways in
which both the SAPS and South African citizens
measure police performance is through
fluctuations in crime statistics. Individuals, shifts
and stations receive monthly targets, which they
need to meet in order to be seen to be functioning
effectively. Former national commissioner, Jackie
Selebi, notoriously lambasted station
commissioners who failed to produce reductions
in crime statistics, leading them to unrealistically
pressure the men and women working beneath
them.4
One negative side effect of the extreme
organisational pressure on police commanders
generated by a quota-based reduction system, has
been the manipulation of crime statistics by station
level members, as reported in the media in late 2009
and early 2010 (discussed in greater detail in the
article by Bruce in this edition of SACQ).5 Although
the SAPS would have us believe this truth-bending
only happens in isolated cases, interviews
conducted by this researcher with at least four
current and former members in different parts of
the country, including two former station
commissioners, suggest such statistics-fixing is
more widespread.6 In Beyond ‘Good Cop’/‘Bad Cop’,
Rajohane Matshedisho observes what he interprets
as police viewing crime statistics, or the meeting of
performance quotas, as more important than 'actual'
policing.7 This provides corroboration for the views
expressed in the interviews mentioned above.
Matshedisho illustrates how statistics-fixing does
not only occur at the sinister level of manipulating
already open cases, nor does it always necessarily
involve rule bending. He recounts time spent with
two members who stop and check cars as part of
their shift assignment. The two police had been
given a target of the number of vehicles that they
needed to stop and search before the end of the
shift. Matshedisho's observation was of the cops
engaging in this task not as a crime prevention
measure, as intended, but only to gather the
information needed to complete the forms that
would reflect the work they had done (e.g. writing
down the licence number). Their work was
motivated by a need to deliver on paper rather than
in practice.
Similarly, many will have experienced driving
through a SAPS roadblock only to have their
driver's licence examined and its details recorded.
Neither the car's roadworthiness nor the driver's
blood alcohol levels are checked, and there is no
search for contraband or firearms. 
In these examples a performance target has been
met and will be reflected in police records, but the
police have not in reality accomplished anything of
significance. 
In a comparable experience in 2010, I was on patrol
with two vans. One of the vans and its occupants
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began the evening shift by issuing fines to five
separate vehicles for various road offences. Later
in the evening when the same van came across an
illegal taxi, and separately, an unlicensed urban
drag racer (pounced on by six speeding police
cars), neither was fined because it was felt enough
fines had been issued for one evening. In this case
there had been no dishonesty or offence
committed on the part of the police. Instead,
police discretion determined whether action was
taken against the offenders. In this case the police
felt they had achieved what was necessary, albeit
according to artificial measures rather than the
requirements of the rule of law (that everyone
should be treated equally before the law). 
In these examples police (in)action is based on a
perceived need to meet particular quantitative
targets, rather than on an understanding of the
role and function of police in society. 
ENFORCING NO LAW
But there is another form of police logic that
encourages illicit deeds, yet is justified by police as
facilitating justice. Take for example the story of a
police inspector who left the service in 2006. He
recounted how, when the opportunity emerged, he
would facilitate the exchange of cash between the
perpetrator and victim of an assault in instances
where the two knew each other, in order to have
charges withdrawn. In return he would pocket a
'commission' from the two.  He believed this
benefited both parties and produced a better
result than would have been achieved by the
criminal justice system: 
I don't have any feelings about it being wrong.
Sometimes when you do something that helps
you, you become happy. I also helped those
guys. I restored their relationship. The one did
not go to jail and the other one was fine with it.8
This kind of action serves a dual purpose, as
another inspector explains:
If I must take all the cases that people want to
report when there's a possibility that they will
withdraw it the next morning, there would be
ten times more cases. So you settle things with
them and you work things out, otherwise you
will be told you haven't done your job. I've seen
a case where it was nearly a murder and the
victim said, 'Just pay the medical expenses and I
will forget it'. They knew each other and were
drinking together.9
Does this type of rule breaking aid police
performance? The fact that these crimes are not
registered contributes to a veneer of low crime
while at the same time the police member
convinces him- or herself that both offender and
perpetrator are better off having avoided formal
judicial procedures. On paper then, and in the




Reductions in station level crime rates are the
holy grail of a station commissioner's
performance assessment as measured by the SAPS
Performance Chart. Eighty per cent of a station
commissioner's personal performance
measurement is derived from the highly complex
chart.10
The chart provides measurements for police
stations according to three categories: operational
performance, data integrity and resource
management. It refers to, but currently does not
provide, due to difficulties in measuring this, a
rating for community satisfaction. The three
categories are not evenly weighted. Eighty-five per
cent of the ultimate measurement of performance,
which is presented as a series of scores, is made
up from quantitative data relating to operational
policing (e.g. reported crime, cases to court,
detection rate, response times, etc.). But not all
crimes are measured in the same way. Weighting
is given to crimes based on their nature and
priority, with violent crime (referred to by the
SAPS as 'contact crime', e.g. robbery, murder,
rape, assault, etc.) most heavily weighted. Crime
statistics generated by policing activities (e.g.
drunk driving, drug arrests, firearm recovery)
carry no weighting. In other words, a high
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number of reported contact crimes will reduce a
police station's performance score. Although
crime statistics generated by policing activities are
viewed in a positive manner and are guided by
quotas, increases in these statistics do not
improve a station's performance score unless a
suspect is sent to court and sentenced, in which
case they count favourably.
Considering the rituals in which station
commissioners have been made to stand up in
front of their peers and account for the low
performance scores of their police stations,11 it is
understandable that any pressure exerted on a
station commissioner is transferred to his or her
members. For example, at a station where I was
working in 2006 an instruction was issued that
police officers should discourage victims of
assault from opening cases. The logic was that
assault cases are so often thrown out of court or
withdrawn by complainants, that they were better
left off the station's records. Although it is easy to
see how the station members could easily accept
this logic as legitimate, the result is that police
management have no idea how much assault is
taking place in their precinct and therefore will
not be able to identify it as an emerging problem.
Furthermore, station management could
erroneously claim that they had reduced assault,
when in fact the opposite could be occurring. By
not recording crime, the police undermine the
ability of government to identify problems,
develop solutions and assess impact. 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND 
POLICE ABUSE
The assessment or measurement of police
performance policies is not only an internal
police matter. Ultimately police need to satisfy the
public. The 2007 ISS Victims of Crime Survey
asked respondents whether they felt the police
were doing a 'good job' or a 'bad job'.
Promisingly, more felt they were performing well
(49 per cent) than badly (38 per cent). The most
common affirmations for good police
performance were the perceptions that police
'arrest criminals' (37 per cent), 'respond on time'
(36 per cent) and 'are committed' (32 per cent).
Negative views of police performance were based
on perceptions that they 'don't respond on time'
(56 per cent), 'are lazy' (26 per cent), 'don't come
to my area' (23 per cent) and 'are corrupt' (22 per
cent). 
Police response times – vital to citizen perceptions
of police – are measured by the SAPS
performance chart, as are arrests. However, in
order for police to meet the public requirement of
being seen to be 'arresting criminals' they need to
formally process individuals through the justice
system by means of arrest, investigation and
prosecution. Perhaps through a combination of
pressure to perform, lack of citizen support, and
investigative incompetence, some police feel
compelled to abuse or torture suspects in order to
achieve these results. Although not yet empirically
investigated on a large scale, reports of torture in
the media and investigations conducted by the
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)
suggest abuse and torture may be routine.12 As a
former member of Crime Intelligence in the Free
State put it:
I don't care who says what, if you're not going to
torture somebody, you're not going to get much
information. That's just the way it is. Liberals
hate to hear that. But they like the result.13
But it's not only retired cops who tell such tales, as
this Johannesburg-based detective constable
shows:
If you want to know more about a suspect you
must interrogate him. Sometimes we use illegal
means to get information from the suspect.
Sometimes you must moer him. Sometimes you
must break the law to get the information…
Unfortunately there's no other way. Most of
these people are hardened criminals. They are
not afraid of police officers. They won't tell you
anything unless you make them tell you.14
And this serving Western Cape Organised Crime
detective:
I've been involved in the usual – a sack over the
head and you throw water over him, or you tube
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around them. This group does not see its work as
extending beyond the end of the shift.
Information is gleaned regarding the whereabouts
of an illegal firearm, but is not passed on at the
end of the evening, the information presumably
lost forever. Among the possible motivating
factors behind this (in)action one should consider
the fact that the seizing of an illegal firearm
would be considered a 'police generated crime',
one that is not given weighting in the SAPS
Performance Chart unless it leads to a positive
conviction. Although the other arrests made by
the group that night would have been similarly
'police generated', the firearm required action
beyond their delineated working hours; would
not have scored the station or shift either positive
or negative performance points; and was ignored.
Like the police member I observed declining to
fine a drag racer because it was felt enough fines
had been issued for the evening, these police may
have already met their quota for recovered
firearms for the month, or, more likely, had not
been issued with a quota, so had not felt
compelled to follow the lead. If the latter is the
case, it reveals another negative ramification of a
quota-based performance measurement system. 
Can a connection be made between a
population's consenting to being policed and
police use of force? Most definitely. In The Dirty
Work of Democracy Antony Altbeker recounts
meeting a detective in Hillbrow who says that
'[When arresting someone in Hillbrow], if they
think you are weak, that is when they will come
after you. The only way is for them to fear us. It's
as simple as that: if they don't fear us then they
shoot.'18 This detective claimed to have fired his
weapon in about twenty incidents, including
waiting for a car thief to step out of his own
vehicle before shooting him. The detective's
words and alleged actions hark to the current
police leadership's 'shoot to kill' rhetoric, as well
as the testimonies of the police members quoted
above. Altbeker notes that this officer's view is
not representative of the service, but also that for
a cop to hold such a view he must live it; he must
be hard. It would seem that South Africans
increasingly expect their police to be just this:
hard.
him – but not anymore. Although it still
happens, I don't participate. I believe that it's
sometimes still the right thing to do… It
happens a lot in Organised Crime.15
In Beyond ‘Good Cop’/‘Bad Cop’ Matshedisho
notes the manner in which police use of violence
as a policing tool has become inculcated at one
Gauteng station. Preparing to beat a suspected
hijacker, a shift constable tells Matshedisho, 'Now
we are going to do our duty', following which the
suspect is beaten and made to inhale pepper
spray from a plastic packet. Matshedisho sees
police use of violence as a show of power, but
also as a performance enhancer in as much as it
is used to solicit confessions or information and
effect arrests.16
In each of these examples the police involved
have clearly legitimised their illegal actions as
being necessary to accomplish their crime
reduction mandate and improve their
performance. That such attitudes are held by
members playing such different policing roles,
and in different provinces and cities, suggests
they have become accepted, if not throughout




In Thin Blue Jonny Steinberg paints a portrait of
contemporary South Africa as a country in
which citizens have yet to consent to being
policed.17 It is one in which two patrolling police
will corner a thief in an alley but leave enough
space for him to escape, satiating bystanders'
need to see the police in action but without
exerting any authority which the public has not
granted them. In Steinberg's reading, this dance
on the part of police is a means to appear to fulfil
their mandate within the constricts of a public's
withheld consent. His depictions present police
officials without legitimacy or power. 
However, he contrasts this image with one of a
team of police roaming the township streets in a
pack and stamping their authority on those
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Do police really need to be 'hard' and liberal with
their use of force and violence in order to 'arrest
criminals', 'respond on time' and 'be committed'?
Although it is easy to see how a culture may
develop that sees violence as a means to these
ends, it is not necessary that it should. 
Acclaimed police academic, David H. Bayley,
suggests that for a police service to be truly
effective it must demonstrate that it is responsive,
available and fair to the population.19 He bases this
on the premise that police are the tool for
legitimising the law and mobilising public support
for a moral regime. Although Bayley agrees that
this is accomplished through the provision of
security, it is easy to see how this provision, if
based on illegitimate means, serves to delegitimise
the police. Bayley believes only about fifteen
police organisations in the world realise this
mandate of responsiveness, availability and
fairness. The SAPS is not one of them. In this
light, police leadership in South Africa could be
said to be sending the wrong message, as a
'tougher', more violent police service is likely to
further undermine the social contract that allows
police to function effectively. 
CONCLUSION
Police performance is assessed on the basis of
operational performance indicators, such as the
number of contact crimes recorded, response
times, and number of cases to court. Although
'community satisfaction' forms part of the SAPS
performance chart, it carries no weight and
remains almost entirely unmeasured at most
stations. 'Community perception' as a whole
remains entirely unmeasured. This is problematic,
particularly considering less than half of adults in
South Africa consider the police to be doing a
'good job'.  Not only do negative perceptions
undermine the legitimacy of the police, but also
potentially that of the government and rule of law.
The 'community satisfaction' portion of the SAPS
performance chart needs to be developed and
applied at all stations and given a reasonable
weighting, in order for the chart to more
holistically assess levels of police performance.
Possible forms this could take are regular exit
polls at police stations or annual surveys
conducted in station precincts. Whether these
rather costly methods are used, or a simpler, more
streamlined system is developed, this aspect of the
chart should be prioritised for completion.
South African police are stuck between a need to
perform, based on the performance chart, and to
meet the principles of community centred
policing. Perhaps most importantly, they need to
perform in a manner that will win over the people
of this country so that they will consent to being
policed. While getting tough on criminals through
the use of torture, and the adoption of 'shoot to
kill' attitudes may appear to satiate public needs,
the misdirection and abuse of force in the long
run is likely to do far more harm than good to
public perceptions of police, not to mention that
such acts are often illegal. If positive perceptions
decline, already scarce citizen-volunteered
information may become harder to come by,
leading to a further reliance on strong-arm short
cuts to achieve results. 
Ultimately, it is clear that within the framework in
which police performance is currently
conceptualised and monitored, some illegal and
illegitimate acts occur because they are seen to
increase police performance as measured by the
SAPS: for example, by diverting would-be cases
away from official records so as to reduce crime
statistics, or forcefully extracting information
from a suspect in the hope that it will aid
investigations.  As important as the SAPS
performance chart is in its current form, a
paradigm shift is needed so that members do not
equate good policing with meeting performance
quotas. Police action should always be motivated
by a sound knowledge of police purpose, and
should involve a consistent application of the law.
Until we see police legitimacy as the ultimate
measure of police performance, illegitimate
activities that enhance current measures of police
performance will continue, and the risk that the
police alienate themselves from the population
will grow. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
CQ No. 31 - Mar 2010  3/17/10  3:21 PM  Page 28
SA Crime Quarterly no 31 • March 2010 25
NOTES
1 South African Police Service, Visions and Mission, 
available online at http://www.saps.gov.za/org_profiles/
vision_mission.htm (accessed 28 January 2010).
2 Examples of research exploring police culture in South 
African include: M Marks, Transforming the Robocops:
changing police in South Africa, Durban: University of
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005; J Hornberger, 'Don't push
this constitution down my throat!' Human rights in
Everyday Practice. An Ethnography of Police
Transformation in Johannesburg, South Africa,
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Utrecht, 2007; A
Altbeker, The Dirty Work of Democracy, Johannesburg:
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2005; J Steinberg, Thin Blue:
the unwritten rules of policing South Africa,
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008; A Faull,
Policing Diversity: an analysis of a diversity intervention
and its effects on a South African Police Service station,
Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2008; D
Vigneswaran & J Hornberger (eds.), Beyond 'Good
Cop'/'Bad Cop': Understanding informality and police
corruption in South Africa, Johannesburg: University of
the Witwatersrand, 2009; and A. Faull, Behind the
Badge: the untold stories of South Africa's Police Service
members, Cape Town: Zebra Press, (forthcoming in
May 2010).
3 Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act  (51 of 1977).
4 This statement is based on a discourse in police circles 
which refers to  'Selebi-gate' or 'the Selebi trials' – the
former commissioner's emphasis on crime statistics as
the ultimate measure of police performance and his
public embarrassment of station commissioners who
failed to keep statistics down. During fieldwork in
April 2009 the former commissioner of a Gauteng
station explained to this author that he was forced to
manipulate statistics in order to avoid public
humiliation. See also: S Alcock, Fear made police cook
stats, 11 July 2009, Mail & Guardian Online,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/ 2009-07-11-fear-made-
police-cook-stats (accessed 14 August 2009).
5 See for example: S Alcock, Crime stats scam exposed, 
5 July 2009, Mail & Guardian Online,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-05-crime-stats-
scam-exposed (accessed 14 August 2009); S Alcock,
Fear made police cook stats, 11 July 2009; L de Vries,




February 2010); C Smith, Probe fingers top FS cops,
News 24.com, 15 January 2010, http://www.
news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/News/1059/ca3cda6
b75d04e238a2163d4fbc4770f/15-01-2010-07
54/Probe_fingers _top_FS_cops (Accessed 9 February
2010).
6 Faull, Behind the Badge.
7 R Matshedisho, Concept Note Eight: 'We must fight 
them!' Police violence, torture and brutality in
Vigneswaran & Hornberger (eds.) Beyond 'Good
Cop'/'Bad Cop': Understanding informality and police
corruption in South Africa.
8 Faull, Behind the Badge. 
9 Ibid.
10 My information on the SAPS performance chart was 
gathered during a three-hour interview with a SAPS
member responsible for working with and training in
the chart. Although authorized to speak with me, the
member requested that s/he remain anonymous in any
publication.
11 See endnote 5.
12 See for example Independent Complaints Directorate 
Annual Report 2008/2009, available at
http://www.icd.gov.za/documents/index.html; 
S Alcock, The torture force, 2 March 2009, Mail &
Guardian Online, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-
03-02-the-torture-force (accessed 10 February 2010);
Report on torture cases investigated by the ICD, 2001,
http://www.icd.gov.za/reports/torture.htm (accessed
10 February 2010); P Joubert, Cops in torture death
probe, 6 April 2009, Mail & Guardian Online,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-06-cops-in-
torture-death-probe (accessed 10 February 2010);
Faull, Behind the Badge.
13 Faull, Behind the Badge.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Matshedisho, Concept Note Eight: 'We must fight 
them!' 
17 Steinberg, Thin Blue.
18 Altbeker, The Dirty Work of Democracy.
19 D Bayley, presentation titled "The Police in War: 
Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime"
made at the Politics, Theory and Methods of Policing
Research: Innovations and Trends conference, Cape
Town, 30 January 2010.
CQ No. 31 - Mar 2010  3/17/10  3:21 PM  Page 29
